Annex B to AMC1 to Article 11 - section overview

In plain language

This section defines the integrity and assurance levels for strategic mitigations (M1) used to reduce the intrinsic ground risk class (GRC) under SORA, including generic criteria for ground risk buffers and population evaluation, as well as specific criteria for tethered operations.

Requirement as structured

This section defines the integrity and assurance levels for strategic mitigations (M1) used to reduce the intrinsic ground risk class (GRC) under SORA, including generic criteria for ground risk buffers and population evaluation, as well as specific criteria for tethered operations.

Original regulatory text

INTEGRITY AND ASSURANCE LEVELS FOR THE MITIGATIONS USED TO REDUCE THE INTRINSIC GROUND RISK CLASS (GRC) B.1 How to use Annex B The following Table B-1 provides the basic principles to consider when using SORA Annex B. Principle description Additional information #1 Annex B provides assessment criteria for the integrity (i.e. safety gain) and assurance (i.e. method of proof) of the applicant’s proposed mitigations. The proposed mitigations are intended to reduce the intrinsic ground risk class (GRC) associated with a given operation. The identification of mitigations is the responsibility of the applicant. #2 Annex B does not cover the LoI of the competent authority. The Lol is based on the competent authority’s assessment of the applicant’s ability to perform the given operation. #3 A proposed mitigation may or may not have a positive effect in reducing the ground risk associated with a given operation. In the case where a mitigation is available but does not reduce the risk on the ground, its level of integrity should be considered equivalent to ‘None’. #4 To achieve a given level of integrity/assurance, when more than one criterion exists for that level of integrity/assurance, all the applicable criteria need to be met. #5 Annex B intentionally uses non-prescriptive terms (e.g. suitable, reasonably practicable) to provide flexibility to both the applicant and the competent authorities. This does not constrain the applicant in proposing mitigations, nor the competent authority in evaluating what is needed on a case-by-case basis. #6 This annex in its entirety also applies to single-person organisations. Table B.1 – Basic principles B.2 M1 — Strategic mitigations for ground risk M1 mitigations are ‘strategic mitigations’ intended to reduce the number of people at risk on the ground. To assess the integrity levels of M1 mitigations, the following need to be considered: (a) the definition of the ground risk buffer and the resulting ground footprint; and (b) the evaluation of the people at risk. With the exception of the specific case of a ‘tether’ provided in the following paragraph (2), the generic criteria to assess the level of integrity (Table B.2) and level of assurance (Table B.3) of the M1 type ground risk mitigations are provided in following paragraph (1). (1) Generic criteria Level of integrity Low Medium High M1 — Strategic mitigations for ground risk Criterion #1 (Definition of the ground risk buffer) A ground risk buffer with at least a 1:1 rule1 or for rotary wing UA defined using a ballistic methodology approach acceptable to the competent authority. The ground risk buffer takes into consideration: (a) improbable2 single malfunctions or failures (including the projection of high energy parts such as rotors and propellers) which would lead to an operation outside the operational volume; (b) meteorological conditions (e.g. wind); (c) UAS latencies (e.g. latencies that affect the timely manoeuvrability of the UA); (d) UA behaviour when activating a technical containment measure; and (e) UA performance. Same as medium3 Comments 1 If the UA is planned to operate at an altitude of 150 m, the ground risk buffer should be a minimum of 150 m. 2 For the purpose of this assessment, the term ‘improbable’ should be interpreted in a qualitative way as ‘Unlikely to occur in each UAS during its total life, but which may occur several times when considering the total operational life of a number of UAS of this type’. 3 The distinction between a medium and a high level of robustness for this criterion is achieved through the level of assurance (Table 3 below). Criterion #2 (Evaluation of people at risk) The applicant evaluates the area of operations by means of on-site inspections or appropriate appraisals to justify lowering the density of the people at risk (e.g. a residential area during daytime when some people may not be present or an industrial area at night time for the same reason). The applicant evaluates the ar

Applies when

operation

EU UAS operation

operation category

Specific

regulatory category

Specific